Originally Syndicated on June 8, 2024 @ 1:47 am
In a recent exposé, The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) has drawn attention to the intricate methods utilized by Russian disinformation campaigns to sway public opinion. A key element of these tactics is known as narrative laundering, which involves crafting misleading information that appears credible by imitating reputable sources. This approach has become increasingly common in light of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, with many false narratives regarding Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his associates gaining traction online.
In the last couple of years, Russian disinformation strategies have propagated numerous unfounded claims, including fabrications that Zelenskyy’s wife purchased a $5 million vehicle and spent over $1 million at Cartier in New York, or that Zelenskyy owned a casino in Cyprus. These falsehoods often incorporate elements from credible investigations like ICIJ’s Pandora Papers to create an illusion of authenticity. One misleading narrative suggested that a firm associated with Zelenskyy’s wife, referenced in the Pandora Papers, established a website for a casino in Cyprus. Another incorrect story implied Zelenskyy was involved in acquiring two yachts through associates Boris and Serhiy Shefir, who were also featured in the Pandora Papers.
ICIJ consulted disinformation specialists to unravel the mechanisms behind these campaigns.
Darren Linvill, a professor at Clemson University, articulated the three phases of narrative laundering: placement, layering, and integration.
- ol]:!pt-0 [&>ol]:!pb-0 [&>ul]:!pt-0 [&>ul]:!pb-0″ value=”1″>Placement: The onset of the story’s dissemination, typically on platforms like YouTube or social media.
- ol]:!pt-0 [&>ol]:!pb-0 [&>ul]:!pt-0 [&>ul]:!pb-0″ value=”2″>Layering: This stage conceals the origin of the false information by distributing it through non-Western news agencies, bot accounts, state-affiliated influencers, and fabricated news websites designed to mimic credible Western media.
- ol]:!pt-0 [&>ol]:!pb-0 [&>ul]:!pt-0 [&>ul]:!pb-0″ value=”3″>Integration: The concluding phase occurs when authentic voices adopt the misinformation, rendering it part of mainstream conversation. Although few disinformation initiatives reach this level, those that do can significantly impact, especially when aided by technologies like generative AI, which reduce costs and enhance the efficacy of these operations.
Emily Bell, the founding director of Columbia University’s Tow Center for Digital Journalism, compares this approach to “pink slime journalism,” where counterfeit news sites pose as trustworthy sources. For example, fake French news platforms played a crucial role in propagating the unfounded tale regarding Zelenskyy’s wife and her alleged extravagant expenditures. NewsGuard Technologies, a company that monitors misinformation, has identified at least 618 websites spreading Russian disinformation.
The success of these disinformation initiatives frequently relies on preexisting beliefs. Bell points out that when misinformation resonates with individuals’ existing beliefs, it spreads swiftly. This reality highlights the necessity of critical thinking and skepticism, although Linvill warns that excessive skepticism can undermine trust in all media. As disinformation methods change, it is evident that both technological progress and heightened public awareness are vital in this continuous “arms race” between disinformation networks and those dedicated to preserving truth and transparency.
For more in-depth analysis, refer to the ICIJ report:
